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Abstract: This paper argues that the DSGE approach to macroeconometrics is the 
dominant approach because it meets the institutional needs of the replicator dynamics of 
the profession, not because it is necessarily the best way to do macroeconometrics. It 
further argues that this “DSGE-theory first” approach is inconsistent with the historical 
approach that economists have advocated in the past and that the alternative European 
CVAR approach is much more consistent with economist’s historically used 
methodology, correctly understood. However, because the European CVAR approach 
requires explicit researcher judgment, it does not do well in the replicator dynamics of the 
profession.  The paper concludes with the suggestion that there should be an increase in 
dialog between the two approaches.  
Keywords: methodology, macroeconometrics, general to specific, DSGE, VAR, 
judgment, incentives 
JEL classification: C10. A1 
1. Introduction 
 
To tell an economist that he chooses that type of work and that viewpoint 
which will maximize what his income is, he will hotly say, a studied insult. 
Such market-oriented behavior will be characterized not with our 
customary phrases such as consumer sovereignty, but in terms as harsh as 
"intellectual prostitution". To adapt one's views to one's audience is hardly 
to be distinguished from the falsification of evidence and other disreputable 
behavior.—George Stigler  
  In this opinion paper I ask a simple question: Why has the European General-to-
Specific Approach to Empirical Macro (Hendry, 1995, Johansen, 1976 and Juselius, 2006) 
had only limited success in the competition for ideas for doing applied macroeconomic 
policy in the U.S.? As an illustration of the General-to-Specific approach I shall discuss 
the cointegrated vector auto regression (CVAR) approach, primarily developed in Europe 
and used by many of the contributors of this special issue, and compare it to the Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) approach, primarily developed in the U.S. where 
it is considered the correct approach to doing macroeconometrics. 
  The initial reaction to this question by most U.S. economists likely will be: “What 
approach is he talking about? We haven’t heard of the CVAR approach; it must be a 
minor approach by some out-of-the-mainstream economists.” Given the lack of 
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familiarity of many economists with this approach, I will discuss in Section 2 what I 
mean by the European CVAR approach, why I call it European, and how it differs from 
the DSGE approach. In Section 3 I shall discuss some hypotheses explaining why the 
European CVAR approach is not winning out in the competitions of ideas and methods 
and relate these to the notion of a representative researcher and the invisible hand of truth. 
In Section 4 I take a historical look at the evolution of macroeconomic theory and how 
that evolution is related to incentives; I argue that there is little historical foundation for 
the pre-eminence of theory approach as interpreted by DSGE advocates, and in fact, there 
is a historical evidence suggesting that their approach is an approach that earlier 
economists would have strongly condemned. In Section 5 I characterize the policy 
implications of the two approaches and discuss the role of theory and judgment in the 
CVAR versus the DSGE approach. In section 6 I combine the arguments in the above 
sections, and argue that given the current replicator dynamics of the academic economics 
profession, there is a bias against methods, such as the European CVAR method, that 
explicitly require the use of researcher intuition and judgment in the analysis.  
2. The European CVAR and the U.S. DSGE Approach to Econometrics 
  There are two ways of thinking about the macroeconomy. The first, which I call 
the Walrasian approach, sees the macro economy as a system that can we can best 
understand through the lens of formal micro-founded theory, based in carefully specified 
micro foundations. Most recently, it is an approach associated with the DSGE model. It is 
the dominant approach taught in U.S. graduate schools and held by U.S. macro 
economists. It is a formal theory first approach. As Campos, Eriksson and Hendry (2005) 
point out this approach “insists on a complete theoretical model of the phenomena of 
interest prior to data analyses.” (pg 1)  
  The alternative approach, which I see the European CVAR approach as consistent 
with, sees the macro economy as more complex than that and does not see a rigid 
microeconomicly grounded theory as especially helpful in shedding light on most 
macroeconomic problems. This approach, which elsewhere I have called the Post 
Walrasian approach (Colander, 2006), has also been nicely described by Campos, 
Eriksson and Hendry. It sees the economy as “a complicated, dynamic, nonlinear, 
simultaneous, high-dimensional, and evolving entity [in which] “social systems alter over 
time; laws change and technological innovations occur.” (pg. 1) This alternative approach 
can be found in small pockets throughout the world, but tends to be more prevalent in 
Europe, which until recently did not buy into the DSGE approach anywhere near as 
completely as did the U.S.  
  There tends to be a similar divide between the U.S. and Europe in 
macroeconometrics. The DSGE theory-first approach to macroeconometrics tends to 
dominate in the U.S. while in Europe there has been, until recently, a more eclectic 
approach, and it is within these eclectic approaches that one finds the CVAR approach.  
2.1. Methodology of the Two Approaches 
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  The two approaches to macroeconometrics differ significantly in their underlying 
methodology. The Walrasian approach, which underlies the predominant dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) approach in macroeconomics, concentrates on 
carefully developing the theoretical model first. Advocates argue that one must first 
specify the theoretical model before one can even have a hope of adequately grasping the 
complex empirical reality. If one doesn’t develop, and stay true to, such a carefully 
specified theoretical model, one will likely be fooled by spurious empirical relationships. 
This means that a DSGE researcher sees all macroeconomic issues through a DSGE lens. 
To keep the formal model tractable, this DSGE approach generally requires the 
researcher to disregard the institutional environment and complex dynamics as possible 
explanations for why what we observe differs from what theory predicts.  
  The DSGE approach requires that only a fully pre-specified theoretical model can 
be brought to the data. It is a “theory-first” methodology, where “theory first” means a 
carefully specified and fully developed formal theory which may deviate significantly 
from the characteristics of the economy that intuitively might be important. Only after 
having fully developed the underlying microeconomic theory in a highly simplified 
model do advocates of the DSGE approach bring their model to the data. When they do 
bring it to the data, they generally use calibrated values for some parameters of the model 
and Bayesian estimation methods to reconcile the information in the data with the theory 
model. While this DSGE approach allows for some flexibility by representing part of the 
empirical dynamics with a simple VAR it usually does so without using the VAR to 
check for misspecification such as parameter non-constancy (parameters are assumed to 
be constant).  
  What I am calling the European CVAR approach uses a quite different 
methodology. Because it sees the outcomes of the economy as data points from a 
complex system, where by complex I mean a system that involves so many interactions 
and potential non-linearities that intuitively, one could not hope to fully specify a formal 
model of the system, the European CVAR approach gives smaller weight to any specific 
formal theory, and instead uses a broad heuristic theoretical understanding of the 
economy, which is guided by, but not necessarily dominated by, a formal theory.
2 Thus, 
for example, the European CVAR approach would address the recent crisis within a 
system of equations where economic behavior is allowed to persistently deviate from 
long-run economic equilibrium states. It would provide information on which other 
variables react on these persistent movements away and where in the system the 
adjustment takes place. Rather than assuming one correct theory it would be open to 
theoretical explanations that are consistent with agents who drive prices away from long-
run attractors for significant periods of time.  
  The European CVAR approach does not deny rationality and equilibrium as the 
foundation of hard core theory; it simply questions the usefulness of an oversimplified 
theoretical model that, to anyone other than a true believer, intuitively does not 
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correspond to a model that would reasonably explain economic behavior as it manifests 
itself in observed economic data.
3
  Given the concern about knowledge that can be deduced from formal theory that 
CVAR advocates have, it is not surprising that the CVAR approach gives more emphasis 
to data analysis. Advocates of this approach use a carefully constructed econometric 
methodology designed to extract as much information as one can from the data. (My 
focus in this paper is the cointegrated vector autoregressive (CVAR) approach advocated 
by Søren Johansen and Katarina Juselius (Johansen and Juselius, 2006, Juselius, 2006), 
but the approach is also related to the related general-to-specific approach advocated by 
David Hendry (Hendry, 2000, 2009).(I see both of these approaches are consistent with 
the broad archeological approach methodologically advocated by Kevin Hoover (Hoover, 
2006, Hoover, Johansen and Juselius, 2008)). 
  These approaches all share the feature that they view economic reality as a 
dynamic system of forces that move equilibria (pushing forces, which give rise to 
stochastic trends) and forces that move equilibria (pulling forces, which give rise to long-
run relations) (Hoover et al., 2008). Thus in this European CVAR approach the formal 
theory of a static economy is adapted to a more heuristic theory that incorporates the 
researcher’s judgment about the effects of institutions, and dynamics on the theoretical 
results into one’s theoretical intuition of what the formal theory is telling one. The 
European CVAR macroeconometric approach is designed to allow the complexity of the 
economic reality to speak as freely as possible through the lens of the institutional 
environment. The data analysis blends with the theoretical analysis to produce a vision of 
reality that is not necessarily correct, but is the best that can be arrived at given such a 
complex system as the macroeconomy. 
2.2. The Importance of Judgment in the European CVAR Approach 
  The important aspect of the European CVAR approach for my argument in this 
article is that it explicitly requires the researcher to use judgment about the applicability 
of theoretical, institutional and empirical information to arrive at a conclusion from the 
analysis. The analysis is as much art as it is science. It is an approach that has a long 
history in economics and I would argue is consistent with the Marshallian/Keynesian 
approach that J.M. Keynes summarized as follows:  
Economics is a science of thinking in terms of models joined to the art of 
choosing models which are relevant to the contemporary world. It is 
compelled to be this, because, unlike the typical natural science, the 
material to which it is applied is, in too many respects, not homogeneous 
through time. The object of a model is to segregate the semi-permanent or 
relatively constant factors from those which are transitory or fluctuating so 
as to develop a logical way of thinking about the latter, and of 
understanding the time sequences to which they give rise in particular 
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cases. Good economists are scarce because the gift for using "vigilant 
observation" to choose good models, although it does not require a highly 
specialized intellectual technique, appears to be a very rare one. (Keynes, 
1938)  
  I associate the CVAR approach to macroeconometrics with Europe because its 
use is more prevalent in Europe than in the U.S.
4 But, even in Europe, the CVAR 
approach is not necessarily winning in the competition with the DSGE models. Instead, it 
is becoming increasingly accepted by macroeconomists, in particular in Central Banks, 
that the appropriate approach to empirical macro policy analysis is the “theory-first” 
DSGE model approach. In particular in US, but also widely in Europe, the DSGE theory 
first approach is in fact becoming the only allowable way to do macroeconometrics. 
Chari et al. (2009) summarize this generally accepted methodological view when they 
write “an aphorism among macroeconomists today is that if you have a coherent story to 
propose, you can do it in a suitably elaborate DSGE model.” Even Michael Woodford’s 
more balanced consideration of the state of macroeconomics (Woodford, 2009) does not 
cite any of the European work as belonging in the new synthesis in macro. For the 
majority of top U.S. macroeconomists, it is as if the European method does not exist.  
3. Some Hypotheses About why the European CVAR Approach is not Winning Out 
  Economists unfamiliar with the European CVAR approach to macroeconometrics 
will likely assume that the reason why this approach is losing out and is not mentioned or 
discussed in papers on modern macroeconomics is that it is not as good as the DSGE 
approach. The implicit assumption of most economists is that the cream rises to the top. 
Since the DSGE approach has risen to the top, it must be the cream. This view would 
follow from the following implicit assumption about the idea and method selection 
process in economics which many economists probably would find plausible: Ideas and 
methods compete, and while the competition is messy, the better ideas and methods 
(those more likely to represent the truth in an uncertain world) tend to win out in a 
sufficiently short time to make it reasonable to assume that prevailing ideas and methods 
are the best ideas and methods.
5 One could say there is what might be called an invisible 
hand of truth that guides the competition toward the truth. This paper challenges that 
assumption. It argues: 
1.  When one uses an economist’s lens to analyze the selection mechanism of 
methods and ideas as it has developed in economics, there is a likely bias in this 
                                                 
4 Thus, whereas in my interviews with U.S. graduate students, (Colander, 2007) almost none had heard of 
the CVAR and Hendry approaches, in my interview with European graduate students (Colander, 2009) 
many more were familiar with it. European and U.S. economics are, of course, intertwined, and there are 
advocates of both positions in both places. For example, Hoover is a Duke. However, he was trained in 
England, and as I will discuss below the approach to macroeconometrics that I am referring to is much 
more prevalent in Europe that in the U.S. Thus, I feel it is appropriate to call it the European approach to 
econometrics. 
5 Challenging that assumption has been an ongoing theme of my research starting with Colander (1991). 
Elsewhere (Colander, forthcoming-a) I have called this view the “representative researcher” view of the 
competition of ideas. In the representative researcher view of methodology the ideas that win out are those 
ideas that a representative researcher would choose. 
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selection mechanism, so one would not necessarily expect that the best ideas and 
methods would rise to the top. 
2.  Based on casual observation, that bias is likely to favor the DSGE theory-first 
approach over the European CVAR approach. 
The specific aspect of the European CVAR approach that I see biasing the choice against 
it is its explicit reliance on researcher judgment as part of the analysis. My argument is 
that any method requiring judgment does not do well in the replicator dynamics of the 
current U.S. economics profession and increasingly in the European economics 
profession. By that I mean that, other things equal, research methods that explicitly 
emphasize the need for explicit judgment lead to fewer publication than do research 
methods that rely on firm rules and avoid discussions of judgment, or make them implicit 
in shared assumptions and conventions, such as the acceptance of a formal theory, or a 
statistical test for significance. The fewer publications reduce the probability of 
advancement for researchers using that methodology, and thus over time, tends to work 
against its use.  
  The bias against judgment is inherent in a blind peer review system. Such systems 
gravitate toward methodologies that incorporate conventions and implicit judgments that 
make researcher judgment less important in deciding whether the paper is publishable or 
not. My suspicion is that the DSGE approach became more prevalent in the U.S. 
compared to Europe because the U.S. has emphasized a blind journal article peer review 
system of advancement whereas, until recently Europe had a more eclectic review system 
that was less phobic about judgment.
6  
3.1. The Representative Researcher and the Invisible Hand of Truth 
The essence of my first argument is that, given the existing academic institutions 
in economics, the dynamic “truth” force pushing for the best idea and method to win out 
is relatively weak in comparison to other specific institutional forces that have little to do 
with the truth of the idea or the usefulness of a method in arriving at the truth. Instead of 
institutional incentives directing researchers to choose the “best method”—the method 
that a representative researcher is assumed to chose—these institutional forces direct 
researchers toward “institutionally consistent” methods of analysis that offer the best 
advancement potential within the existing institutional structure. My point is that 
institutional consistent methods are not necessarily the methods that are most likely to 
lead to the truth. While the “appropriateness of the approach or idea” (its contribution 
toward seeing the truth) clearly plays a role in that process, many other forces do as well, 
which means that the intricacies of the institutional structure of the economics become 
central to the understanding of economists’ choice of ideas and methods.
7
For example, in an institutional structure that requires a certain type of peer 
review for advancement, some research methods and ideas are more likely to be 
amenable to that peer-review process than others. My argument is that those 
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7 That is why I have directed much of my work toward understanding those institutional structures. 
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“institutionally consistent” ideas and methods are likely to be favored by the profession 
and, therefore, to matter. over others that do not fit so well in the existing particular type 
of peer review system. That, I argue, may well be the case with the European CVAR 
method.  
The institutional feedback on theory and method choice described above has not 
previously been considered by economic methodologists because they tend to think of the 
competition of ideas as occurring within a representative researcher’s mind.
8 So, unless 
that representative researcher is ideological or stupid (which few, outside heterodox 
economists, believe is the case), the representative researcher can be assumed to choose 
the idea and method that best captures the truth. This leads economists to the implicit 
conclusion that the “best” methods and ideas win out.  
My conclusion is different and follows from my alternative way of thinking about 
the economics profession.
9 Similarly as George Stigler (1960) in the introductory 
quotation suggested might be the case, I see economists as motivated by self-interest and 
incentives. Specifically, I see economics as a complex system in which many models and 
methods are competing. That competition takes place in a very specific institutional 
environment and over time the incentives in that environment feeds back on the choices 
researchers make about model and method. Thus, the current emphasis on economists 
accumulating quality-weighted journal article publications plays a major role in 
determining the models and methods that the profession adopts.  
My hypothesis is that in the current academic economics institutional 
environment of ‘publish or perish’ (in the right journals0 there are very few incentives for 
top young economists to reflect on the overall economic research process, but there are 
strong incentives for them to focus on narrow technical issues. The reason is that there 
are few publishing outlets for broad reflective pieces that would count in the 
advancement and promotion criteria.
10 It follows that, other things equal, those 
researchers who think about such issues are much less likely to advance in the field of 
economics.
 11
                                                 
8 In doing so, they fall subject to the same fallacy of composition that I believe DSGE modelers fall into; 
they attribute rationality to the system results that would only likely exist if the system were a single 
individual. 
9 As will be obvious to readers familiar with methodological work, the approach I use has connections to 
the work of Thomas Kuhn and Imre Lakatos. Since discussing it would involve a long discussion, and I 
have briefly discussed this work elsewhere (Landreth and Colander, 2001) I will not discuss it here, other 
than to say that my approach differs from their in that I am describing a complexity field of science 
(Colander, 200x) rather than a standard field of science. I ague that in such complexity fields of study, 
where less guidance comes from empirical work, much more focus has to be given to professional 
advancement incentives in the choice of assumptions and methodologies than they do in the standard 
natural sciences. 
10 This obviously differs by institution. For example, at a liberal arts colleges, such as where I am at, there 
is a stronger incentive to do such reflective work, and work that involves judgment, since a wider range of 
scholarly output is considered than is the case at most universities. But even at institutions that include a 
wider range of scholarly output in their advancement criteria, there are few outlets for such reflective 
research that would move a young economist up in the profession.  
11 Elsewhere (Colander, forthcoming-a) I have distinguished a “consumer’s knowledge” of theory from a 
“producer’s knowledge” of theory, arguing that to use a theory in policy one needs a “consumer’s 
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Because there are few incentives within the profession to be reflective on the 
overall rationality of profession’s methods and ideas, few economist are reflective. Most 
are concerned with narrower issues—issues that lead them to success within the existing 
institutional structure. Because few economists are focused on taking a broad reflective 
approach, the composite view of all researchers is a composite of views of economists 
who have few incentives to think deeply about the issues. Hence, there is no justification 
for assuming that the composite of economists’ views will reflect the view of a reflective 
representative researcher. I will argue below that the “representative researcher” 
approach is not the way to think about how the profession arrives at its methods or ideas. 
If one accepts my complex system view of the profession, such a composite 
“representative researcher searching for the truth” view of the profession’s views is 
incorrect.  
4. Incentives and the Evolution of Macroeconomic Theory 
Elsewhere, (Colander, 2006a) I have applied this view to the history of 
macroeconomic theory. In that work I have argued that the path that the Keynesian 
revolution followed can be best understood within this institutional incentive approach to 
the competition of ideas. I argued that Keynes had a vague vision of the macroeconomy 
as a complex system with multiple basins of attraction and complex dynamics. He sensed 
that such a system could get into trouble and could end up at an undesirable equilibrium. 
Unfortunately, the mathematics to deal formally with such issues was not fully developed 
at the time, and most economists were not even close to having the technical expertise 
needed to formally frame the issue in such a vision.  
So while Keynes’s initial idea was visionary, it was not an idea that could survive 
within the then existing institutional framework that advanced economists on the basis of 
their writings. This worked against highly mathematical economists of the time, such as 
Richard Strotz (Strotz et al. 1953) and Richard Goodwin (1947), who were developing 
that complexity vision formally. The problem was that most economists of the time felt 
uncomfortable dealing with the complex mathematics needed to formally deal with the 
complexity vision of the macroeconomy that Strotz and Goodwin were putting forward. 
Their work was beyond the level of many of the economists at the time. It also worked 
against heuristic economists, such as G.L.S. Shackle (1955) or Hyman Minsky (1986) 
whose work focused on developing an intuitive understanding of macroeconomics within 
that complexity vision. Their heuristic work reflected an educated “consumer’s 
understanding” of the complexity approach, but did not offer a clear path forward to 
advance it. Neither of these approaches did well in the competition of ideas in the post 
Keynesian period.  
In the representative researcher view, the failure of these approaches must have 
been because they were flawed, and not as good as the ideas or methods that won out. In 
my complex systems view of the economics profession, the explanation may have been 
(and I suspect it was) that these methods and ideas did not offer a research path for 
                                                                                                                                                 
knowledge” but that students are only taught to be producers, and that there are outlets only for producers, 
not consumers.  
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students that would allow them to survive and advance in the then-existing replicator 
dynamics of the profession.  
The problem for the students of the highly mathematical economists of the time 
was that such mathematical research was incomprehensible to most economists. Only few 
researchers were on the forefront of both mathematics and economics. While these highly 
mathematical economists were seen as brilliant, they were far ahead of their times, and 
their students did not do well in the replicator dynamics of the time. The reason was that 
most of the “peers” doing the reviews of the research did not have the mathematical 
sophistication to see the contributions of these students as adding significantly to our 
understanding.
12 Thus, these mathematical economists generated few highly successful 
students to carry on their complexity views, and the latter faded away. The problem for 
the students of the heuristic economists was somewhat different. Once their professors 
had pointed out that the economy is complex, nonergodic, and fundamentally subject to 
uncertainty, there was not much more to say. This meant that the students did not do well 
in the replicator dynamics of the profession because they simply repeated the insights of 
their professors.  
The result of these failures was that, instead of becoming a complexity revolution, 
the “Keynesian revolution” was quickly translated into a rather mundane set of ideas that 
were more amenable to the peer review replicator dynamics of the time. Keynesian 
economics, which could have been the beginning of a complexity revolution in 
economics, evolved into neoKeynesian economics, which modeled the economy as a 
unique equilibrium, comparative static, multi-market equilibrium system, in which the 
only problem was institutional rigidities. The current mainstream of modern US 
macroeconomics argues as if neoKeynesian economic theory is the only alternative to the 
DSGE modeling approach. This is far from the case. In my view, the serious alternative 
to the DSGE model is the complex systems model of macroeconomics (Colander, et al, 
2008) and the European macroeconometric approach is best seen as the empirical branch 
of that complex systems approach. 
4.1. Macro-econometrics, Incentives, and the Complex Systems Approach 
In other papers and books, (Colander, 2006) I have discussed in more depth my 
complex systems view of the evolution of macroeconomic theory. In this paper, my 
interest is in on a very small sub-issue of my larger story—the profession’s choice of 
macroeconometric method and its lack of interest in the European approach to 
macroeconometrics. My argument here is not that the European approach to 
macroeconometrics is necessarily better than the theory-first DSGE approach. My goal is 
simply to argue that, when one considers the incentives within the profession that guide 
model and method choice, that there are strong reasons to believe that, given current 
incentives, the profession would choose the theory-first DSGE approach not because it is 
                                                 
12 For a discussion of some of the problems of peer review in economics, see Shepherd (1995) 
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inherently better in some broader sense, but because it better fits the institutional 
incentive structure of academic economics.
13
  Aris Spanos (this issue) nicely discusses the issues in debate between the general 
to specific approach (which is a part of what I am calling the European CVAR approach, 
and the prevalence of theory approach, which I am calling the theory-first DSGE 
approach to macroeconometrics. He presents the debate as one in which there are 
reasonable arguments on both sides. In taking this moderate view, he stands in marked 
contrast to Robert Solow’s condemnation of the DSGE modeling approach (Solow, 2008). 
Solow, who represents what might be called the recent Neoclassical NeoKeynesian 
tradition in macroeconomics, sees the DSGE approach as essentially a “rhetorical 
swindle” that the “macro community has perpetrated on itself, and its students” (Solow, 
2007, 235). The CVAR approach, while not sharing Solow’s support of the more 
traditional macroeconomic models, agrees with Solow in that assessment not because the 
DSGE model is logically incorrect, but because it does not pass the judgment test; it is 
simply beyond belief that with all the assumptions the DSGE model must make to arrive 
at a formal model, that that model sheds much light on the type of short run problems that 
the macro economy often experiences. It simply does not meet the “common sense” test, 
so unless there are other arguments for using it, it is not an approach to policy that anyone 
other than someone who has been taught that it is the only correct theory would use as the 
sole approach for thinking about macroeconomic policy.  
  Within the “representative researcher” view of the economics profession, Solow’s 
comment has no foundation; he is arguing that the ideas and methods that have won out 
within the profession are not the best, and are highly flawed. Within my complex system 
view of the profession, Solow’s remark may well make sense; he is arguing that the 
replicator dynamics in the profession have produced economists who may be good at 
succeeding within the current academic institutions, but that, in his judgment, those 
academic institutions are flawed because those institutions have allowed a method that 
makes little intuitive sense to become a required method for all macroeconomists.
14 The 
argument of this paper supports Solow’s more uncompromising view of the theory-first 
DSGE approach. While there are certainly arguments for both sides, as Spanos argues, 
there is, in my view, far less support for the current theory-first DSGE approach than the 
DSGE modelers have assumed.  
4.2. The Lack of Historical Foundations of the “Theory-first” Approach 
One of the arguments that supporters of the DSGE modeling approach use, and 
that Spanos accepts, is that the theory-first approach is simply carrying on a tradition that 
has long existed in economics: Thus, historically there is some justification for such an 
approach. I will argue below that this is an incorrect assessment of the history of 
economics.  
                                                 
13 As an example of the failure of the European approach, consider that when, in my recent study of 
graduate economic education in the US I asked graduate students at six top university programs about 
cointegrated vector auto regression, or the general the specific approach to macroeconometrics few 
students had heard about it. 
14 I discuss these issues further in Colander. (forthcoming-b.)  
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Specifically, I agree with those economists who took a strong interest in 
methodology, such as Nassau Senior (1836) J. N Keynes (1891) or Lionel Robbins (1932) 
would not agree with the theory-first DSGE methodology. While it is true that Senior, 
Keynes and Robbins downplayed empirical work, their arguments in support of theory 
and against empirical work have to be understood in context. At the time Keynes and 
Robbins were writing, empirical work was rudimentary; the lack of data, statistical tools, 
and computing power made it almost impossible to derive any sound knowledge from 
data analysis. Their downplaying of empirical work at the time implies nothing about 
their views about the role of data or empirical work today. For example, after discussing 
the problems with empirical work Robbins writes: “Fortunately there is reason to suppose 
that in the future the alliance between the economy theorist and the statistician will be 
even closer than it has been in the past.” (Robbins, 1930, 21). Thus, all that one can 
surmise from the lack of support of empirical work of earlier economists is that given the 
empirical techniques of the time, they felt that they could not rely on empirical work to 
answer questions. So, the historical connection argument that economists have taken a 
“prevalence of theory” over an empirically based approach cannot be seen as providing 
historical support for the current “prevalence of theory” approach. Methodology is, and 
should be, dependent on technology; when technology changes, methods should change 
as well. 
4.3. What Earlier Economists Meant by “Theory” was not what DSGE Advocates 
Mean by “Theory” 
  A second reason why methodological practices of earlier economists cannot be 
used as historical justification for the current “DSGE theory-first” approach over the 
European approach is that for earlier economists “theory” meant something quite 
different than does “theory” for modern macroeconomists. Specifically, earlier 
economists distinguished between economic science and political economy.
15 For them, 
theory in economic science meant something different than theory in political economy.  
  Nassau Senior, who focused his work on identifying and organizing basic 
principles in a scientific framework (Schumpeter calls him the first “pure theorist” in 
economics.) wrote the following: 
  (The economist’s) premises consist of a very few general propositions, the 
result of observation, or consciousness, and scarcely requiring proof, or even 
formal statement, which almost every man, as soon as he hears them, admits as 
familiar to his thoughts, or at least as included in his previous knowledge: and his 
inferences are nearly as general, and, if he has reasoned correctly, as certain, as 
his premises.  
  But his conclusions, whatever be their generality and their truth, do not 
authorize him in adding a single syllable of advice. That privilege belongs to the 
writer or statesman who has considered all the causes which may promote or 
                                                 
15 The discussion here is a summary about which I have written about at length. Since much of modern 
economics’ approach relates to Robbins, who in turn based his approach on the Classical methodological 
approach, I will concentrate on his approach. 
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impede the general welfare of those whom he addresses, not to the theorist who 
has considered only one, though among the most important of those causes. The 
business of a Political Economist is neither to recommend nor to dissuade, but to 
state general principles, which it is fatal to neglect, but neither advisable, nor 
perhaps practicable, to use as the sole, or even the principle, guides in the actual 
conduct of affairs. (Nassau Senior, 1836, pg 2-3) 
  For Senior, economic science was a branch of logic.  In the science of economics 
one did theory, which meant drawing theorems from almost self-evident principles. 
Economic theory was not meant to directly guide policy, which he saw a much more 
complicated. To move from the theorems of the science of economics to policy required 
common sense judgment and institutional which economic theorists did not necessarily 
possess. The method was further developed by J.N. Keynes (1890) in his famous 
summary of economist’s methodology. Like Senior, J.N. Keynes saw the science of 
economics as a relatively narrow branch of economics. In this science of economics, 
theory meant something very similar to the DSGE modelers have in mind. Their 
scientific theory was a highly formal set of propositions that consisted of primarily 
deductive reasoning based on first principles. It consisted of this because, given the 
empirical tools of the time, deductive reasoning was the only branch of economics that 
could potentially rise to the level of scientific knowledge.
16 For Keynes and for many 
Classical and early neoclassical economists, however, that scientific theory had little 
relevance to policy analysis; it was only one tool among many to be used by a political 
economist. Lionel Robbins was quite clear about this. In his review of Hawtrey (Robbins, 
1927), a review that included many of the ideas that would later become embodied in his 
famous 1932 essay, Robbins stated clearly what he thought about using scientific theory 
to derive precise policy conclusions. He writes: 
What precision economists can claim at this stage is largely a sham precision. In 
the present state of knowledge, the man who can claim for economic science 
much exactitude is a quack. (Robbins, 1927, 176) 
For both Keynes and Robbins, policy discussions did not belong in the science of 
economics; they belonged in political economy or in what Keynes called the art of 
economics. Theory in political economy was a much broader theory than the formal 
theory of science. It consisted of an understanding of the formal scientific theory, but also 
an understanding of the limitations of that theory, accepted value judgments of society, as 
well as knowledge of the institutions of the times. Political economy theory was a 
common sense theory that captured the educated common sense of economists of the time. 
It was a theory that involved, and had to involve, value judgments. 
Robbins made the need to separate the science of economic from political 
economy clear in his Ely Lecture. He writes: 
                                                 
16 Alfred Marshall (1890) downplayed the distinction between political economy and economic science, 
and started using the term science in a broader sense, but he also argued strongly against any use of formal 
deductive models as part of the analysis. For Marshall, all of economics was what earlier classical 
economists had called political economy. (See Colander, forthcoming-b )  
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My suggestion here, as in the Introduction to my Political Economy: Past and 
Present, is that its (political economy) use should be revived as now covering that 
part of our sphere of interest which essentially involves judgments of value. 
Political Economy, thus conceived, is quite unashamedly concerned with the 
assumptions of policy and the results flowing from them. I may say that this is not 
(repeat not) a recent habit of mine. In the Preface to my Economic Planning and 
International Order, published in 1937, I describe it as “essentially an essay in 
what may be called Political economy as distinct from Economics in the stricter 
sense of the word. It depends upon the technical apparatus of analytical 
Economics; but it applies this apparatus to the examination of schemes for the 
realization of aims whose formulation lies outside Economics; and it does not 
abstain from appeal to the probabilities of political practice when such an appeal 
has seemed relevant. (Robbins, 1981, 8)  
For Robbins, the theory of economic science was simply the “technical apparatus” of the 
theory of political economy. But that theory of political economy went far beyond that 
technical apparatus, and included a much wider range of argumentation and 
understanding.  
  This history sheds a quite different interpretation to the historical antecedents to 
the theory-first DSGE approach. It is not similar to the approach that Classical 
economists used. When Classical economists stated that policy was based on theory, they 
did not mean it was based on a single scientific theory (that was simply a “technical 
apparatus”) as is done by DSGE advocates. Instead, policy was based on a broader sense 
of theory that included judgments of relevance of the technical apparatus to the problem 
at hand. What Robbins never would have done is to directly draw policy conclusions 
from a theoretical model without considering the appropriateness of the theory to the 
problem at hand. Yet this is precisely what the “theory-first” DSGE model advocates 
seem to claim: if we do not ground our models in formal theory, we will know nothing.
17 
The problem is that when we do ground our policy thinking in formal theory that is not 
relevant to the problems at hard, we can end up thinking we know something that we 
don’t, which in many ways is worse than knowing that we do not know something.   
When one combines these two historical insights about earlier economist’s 
method, arguments, it is clear that rather than being a continuation of economist’s method, 
the “theory-first” DSGE model approach is a significant deviation from earlier 
economist’s method. In fact, I would argue that the European approach to 
macroeconometrics is much closer to the spirit of the classical approach to policy 
analysis. No doubt, the European approach differs from the earlier approach in that it 
gives more focus to empirical data. But that can be explained by the change in empirical 
technology. Today, much more in the way of data is available; much more in the way of 
statistical tools are available and much more in the way of computing power is available. 
These advances have opened up a new way to doing macroeconomic theory and of 
                                                 
17 The problem with that reasoning was pointed out by Kevin Hoover. He writes: ”There is a fundamental 
problem: How do we come to our a priori knowledge? Most macroeconomists expect empirical evidence to 
be relevant to our understanding of the world. But if that evidence only can be viewed through totalizing a 
priori theory, then it cannot be used to revise the theory." (Hoover, 2006) 
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developing policy-useful macroeconomic theory. This means that today, it may be 
possible to discover patterns in the data in ways that are fundamentally different than 
existed in Keynes’ and Robbins’ time, and only a Luddite would not want to take 
advantage of those.  
5. Characterizing the Debate in Macroeconometrics 
  With that historical background, let me reconsider the debate between the DSGE 
theory-first approach and the European approach to macroeconometrics. As my 
discussion of the history of economics makes clear, the approach being used by the 
majority of macroeconomists should be called the “preeminence of the DSGE theory” 
approach, not the “preeminence of theory” approach that characterized Classical 
economics. The modern DSGE methodology is not an approach that elevates theory 
above empirical work, but instead is an approach that elevates one particular way of 
using theory -the DSGE modeling approach- above all other ways. The theory-first 
DSGE approach is best seen as a highly limiting way of doing macroeconometrics, and 
macroeconomic policy. It is an approach that Senior, Keynes and Robbins would have 
strongly opposed.  
  To see the misuse of theory in policy analysis that can occur by users of the 
theory-first DSGE approach, consider VV Chari and Patrick Kehoe’s (2006) discussion 
of policy relevance of the DSGE model. They write: 
The message of examples like these is that discretionary policy making 
has only costs and no benefits, so that if government policymakers can be 
made to commit to a policy rule, society should make them do so. (pp. 7-8)  
and: 
Macroeconomists can now tell policymakers that to achieve optimal 
results, they should design institutions that minimize the time 
inconsistency problem by promoting a commitment to policy rules. 
However, to what particular policies should policymakers commit 
themselves? For many macroeconomists considering this question, 
quantitative general equilibrium models have become the workhorse 
model, and they turn out to offer surprisingly sharp answers. (p. 9)  
For Robbins, such statements are ones only a quack would make.  
5.1 The Role of Theory in the European CVAR Approach  
As I understand it, the European CVAR approach to macroeconomics is not anti-
theoretical in the broad political economy sense. It is a blend of broad theory disciplined 
by careful data analysis. The idea is to uncover empirical regularities in the data that can 
be given a broad interpretation given the underlying theory models. That’s why Hoover 
calls it an archeological approach: carefully excavated results are used to guide theorists 
as to what theories to use. This, of course, does not exclude the possibility that the 
empirical results might be masking the true relationships and that one’s intuition tells the 
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theorist to disregard the highly imperfect data. Therefore, before making judgment about 
policy, the European approach requires the economist to carefully consider the 
relationship between the best available theory and the best available data. The key to the 
European approach to macroeconometrics is bringing the data to the theory, and 
bringing the theory to the data. To do that is an art that requires researcher judgment, so 
researcher judgment is integral to the European method. In some ways it is a “wisdom of 
crowds of specialists” approach, where specialists compare analyses and interpretations, 
argue about differences in interpretation, and come to a conclusion.  
Let me reiterate. The European CVAR approach does not put data ahead of 
political economy theory; it simply uses data in sorting through the many alternatives that 
a broad political economy theory may lead to. Thus, the European CVAR approach is 
totally compatible with what could be called a “prevalence of theory” approach in the 
political economy context. If one cannot gain any reliable information from the data, then 
one would have to rely on broad political economy theory combined with a good 
understanding of institutions. This would be in the tradition of Henry Thornton or Walter 
Bagehot—a tradition carried on by modern economists such as Charles Goodhart and 
Perry Mehrling. Their work is theory-first in the European tradition.  
Using the European CVAR approach, one takes an agnostic approach to the value 
of the data and theory analysis. The empirical model analysis may be highly informative, 
in which case it would be used to provide guidance to policy, or it may be of limited 
value, in which case one accepts that one has to rely on one’s intuition and knowledge of 
institutions to guide policy. If that’s the best we can do, so be it. However, it seems 
plausible that an empirical methodology that allows the data to speak as freely as possibly 
about underlying empirical mechanisms is more likely to be able to discriminate between 
these two cases than a methodology that forces one particular view on the data. Because 
of limitations of our data and our theories, economic policy will always be based on 
judgment to some extent. To pretend we know the theory is not sufficient for claiming a 
“scientific” foundation of our policy.  
5.2. Why the CVAR Approach Might Seem Anti-DSGE 
The European approach to macroeconometrics is not inherently anti-DSGE theory. 
However, it may seem to be anti-DSGE theory for two reasons. The first is that the 
DSGE model, contrary to the European CVAR, does not specifically allow for intuitive 
judgment to be part of the analysis. It requires researchers to use a model of the macro 
economy that, in its current state of development, does not include a significant number 
of heterogeneous agents, the possibility of complex dynamics, multiple equilibria and 
structural breaks unflinchingly in analyzing the macroeconomy. For most non 
macroeconomic specialists, it strains credibility that no intuitive judgment is needed to 
make the DSGE model applicable. But the DSGE theory first approach does not allow 
such judgment. Somehow, in spite of the large amount of uncertainty that will naturally 
be associated with such a model, it is supposed to shed significant light on a 
macroeconomy that includes all those omitted elements and guide us as to how to set 
fiscal and monetary policy. Were that the case, it would truly be a miracle.  
10/7/2009 15  Economists, Incentives and Empirical Work 
The above argument does not deny that useful theories may well be 
counterintuitive, nor that the implausibility of the DSGE model alone is not sufficient 
reason to abandon it. If it could be shown that the DSGE model fits that data better than 
alternatives, that intuitive implausibility of the DSGE model could be overridden by the 
empirical results. This leads to the second reason why the European approach seems anti-
DSGE. When European researchers put the DSGE model to careful empirical tests, they 
have found that the DSGE model does not meet these data criteria either.  
An example of its failure can be seen by considering a recent paper by Peter 
Ireland (2004) that purported to take the DSGE model to the data. In his study, Ireland 
started with the assumption that a simple real business cycle model can explain the US 
experience in the post Second World War period. He made his theoretical model more 
‘flexible’ by imbedding it in a DSGE model framework in which total factor productivity 
was assumed to be a stochastic near unit root trend driving the other variables. The paper 
was impressive, and was high-level cutting edge work to almost all economists who do 
not specialize in time series econometrics, such as myself, and the large majority of 
economists, including many DSGE macro theorists. It was published in a good journal. 
To test the difference between the European CVAR approach and the theory-first 
DSGE model approach to macroeconometrics, I asked Johansen and Juselius to consider 
Ireland’s paper for a conference I was organizing. Specifically, I asked them to highlight 
the difference between the two approaches. I had expected the normal nuanced 
differences, but that is not what I got; what I got was a blistering critique of the Ireland 
paper. These can be found in Johansen (2006) and Juselius and Franchi (2007).
18  
For European macroeconometrics advocates, Ireland’s paper has two serious 
problems. The first is that it fails to meet some minimum statistical assumptions. As 
discussed by Spanos, its failure to meet these is not in debate between DSGE modelers or 
European macroeconomists modelers. The problem is that Ireland made assumptions 
about empirical relationships in the data that, if one were not fully committed to the view 
that the theory is right independent of the data, should have been tested, and if he had 
tested them, the assumptions would have been seen to be false. But he did not test them.
19 
If he was committed to the view that the theory was right independent of the data, then 
why even bother bringing the model to the data. It would seem more reasonable for him 
to just state that the model is right, and skip bringing it to the data. That may be the 
correct way; the information to be gleaned from the data is highly questionable; my point 
is simply that if you are going to bring a model to the data, then it should be done in a 
meaningful way.  
Juselius and Franchi carried the analysis of Ireland’s paper further; they show that 
when the correct specification tests were done in the Ireland model, essentially all of 
                                                 
18 While Ireland’s work is chosen as an example, it should be seen as representative, and other papers could 
have been chosen to represent the US theory comes first approach.  
19 The failure of Ireland’s paper to meet the statistical assumptions should have meant that the paper never 
should have made it through the peer review process, and the fact that is did should raise serious concerns 
about that peer review process. When, at my suggestion, in private correspondence, Johansen raised these 
issues with Ireland, Ireland seemed unconcerned about them. 
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Ireland’s results are rejected! Moreover, when the model is reformulated based on the 
European approach, the conclusions are reversed! Despite Juselius and Franchi’s negative 
findings, the DSGE model is not necessarily wrong, and some other theory right. All their 
findings mean is that Ireland’s paper, which seemed to be providing empirical support for 
the DSGE model, did not provide that support. If one believes that the DSGE model is 
the model economists should use. The justification must lie in one’s intuition that the 
DSGE model is the correct model, not because the DSGE model fits the data. 
The question macroeconomic empirical researchers have to ask is whether 
Ireland’s paper is an anomaly, or whether it is an example of the disregard for the data 
that the “DSGE model first” approach encourages. I am not enough of an econometrician 
to make a conclusive judgment on this issue, but the sense that I get from my interviews 
with economists, and from my studies of U.S. graduate economic education (Colander, 
2007) is that Ireland’s cavalier approach to empirically testing the model is representative 
of the more general “DSGE model first” macro approach to data analysis that most U.S. 
graduate students are taught, and that they consequently practice.  
6. The Bias Against Methods based on Intuition and Judgment in the Economics 
Profession 
Let me now combine the two arguments of the paper—the bias in the replicator 
dynamics of the economic academic institutions, and the lack of success of the European 
CVAR approach. My claim is that it is likely that the success of the DSGE model 
approach as compared to the European approach is in large part due to a bias in the 
replicator dynamics of the profession against methods such as the CVAR approach the 
explicitly requires researcher judgment. The problem is that the European approach 
requires macroeconomists to explicitly base their arguments on intuition and judgment, 
both about the data, the institutions and the theory. Such judgments are difficult to assess, 
and almost impossible to access in blind peer review journals. Who does the analysis 
matters. This means that papers using the European CVAR approach do not have a ready 
outlet in journals and thus the method does not do well in the replicator dynamics of the 
profession.  
The bias in the current replicator dynamics of the economics profession against 
analysis which emphasizes the need for explicit judgment is in my view a key 
explanation for the success of the theory-first DSGE-model approach and the lack of 
success of the European approach. The DSGE theory-first approach allows one to 
proceed as if one needs no intuition and judgment. It revels in the counter intuitiveness of 
the theory, seeing counter intuitiveness as strength rather than a weakness, and thus 
allows all sorts of models that do not pass a minimum intuitive smell test. And then it 
does not require researchers to bring the model to the data in a reasonable way.   
I suspect that Ireland did not test whether the basic underlying assumptions in his 
model were true because the publishing incentive system he faced, and his commitment 
to “theory comes first” macroeconomics, did not guide him to do so. Instead, it guided 
him to get a published paper. He was successful; the paper was published and widely 
cited because it used high-level econometric techniques, and because it brought a “DSGE 
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model to the data.” In the current academic economics incentive structure, publishing has 
almost become an end in itself, and there is little cost associated with a mistake or taking 
a less than careful approach.
20
  It is that same focus on publishing that biases the economics profession against 
the European method of econometrics. The problem is that the European approach does 
not offer an unambiguous alternative model to replace the “theory-first DSGE model” 
with. It is a method, not a model. Thus, it requires one to be a specialist in both statistics, 
in the history of institutions and in macroeconomic theory. It does not allow a separation 
between the three. Moreover, to choose among alternative theories, a researcher using the 
European approach must make numerous substantive judgments about the 
appropriateness of the assumptions. Those substantive judgments must be made on the 
basis on intuition, one’s understanding of theory, and one’s understanding of 
institutions.
21
The importance of judgment in the European approach can be seen in the 
following comment from Søren Johansen (Johansen and Juselius, forthcoming). In it he 
stated:  
So there is now something called the Johansen Procedure, and it is completely 
misleading to believe it can as such be applied to data that are fractionally 
integrated or heteroscedastic, or whatever. The Johansen procedure consists of 
checking the assumptions and then once you know the model is reasonably 
OK, you go and apply it. It is not just pressing the J button – that is certainly 
completely inappropriate - but this is unfortunately how it has often been used. 
It may look like you are doing sophisticated econometric work, but what you 
are doing is probably close to worthless. My contribution to cointegration 
analysis was simply to analyze the maximum likelihood estimator and the 
likelihood ratio test in the Gaussian model. But before you use maximum 
likelihood, you have to be sure that you have the right model, otherwise the 
estimator and test do not have the optimal properties you think they have. 
  Most econometrics is still taught as methods - almost like cookbooks 
where you have receipts for method 1, method 2, and method 3. That’s not the 
way Katarina [Juselius] and I approach the data. We first choose the method 
that fits the circumstances. It needs a lot more careful thinking than is usually 
                                                 
20 Now I am certainly not claiming that all US macroeconometrics involves sloppiness, or that it is only 
macroeconometrics that involves sloppiness. What I am suggesting is that the incentive system in 
academic economics encourages researchers to hide judgment. This sloppiness has been pointed out by a 
number of researchers, Including, Edward Leamer (1983), Lawrence Summers’ (1991), Deirdre 
McCloskey (McCloskey and Ziliak, 1996), and (Dewald et al. 1986), Peter Swan (2006) among others. 
The assessment that was held by many economists was that the informational content of many aspects of 
empirical research in macro was close to zero. (Cooley and Leroy 1981). Despite the concerns expressed 
about the informational content of the econometric studies, thousands of such studies were published in the 
US. 
21 It is these substantive judgments that Classical economists saw as part of the “theory” when talking about 
political economy. Political economy theory was the technical apparatus of scientific theory modified by 
educated common sense and institutional knowledge. 
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associated with writing an applied paper in econometrics. Of course, this has 
nothing to do with cointegration, but it has everything to do with carefully 
applying statistical methods to data. With modern computers, it is getting 
easier to do, but it is also getting easier to do wrongly.  
  The DSGE model allows separation of theory from empirical work. That reduces 
the judgment researchers must make: Accept that the DSGE model is the right one, and 
get on with one’s work. That allows individuals to specialize—some can specialize in 
theory—even though intuitively one might have a hard time justifying that further work 
on the theoretical model is helping us understand the problems we face in the economy. It 
doesn’t require one to be simultaneously a theorist, a macro econometrician, and a 
institutionally knowledgeable practitioner to publish. Judgments are still there, but they 
are implicit; they are hidden in the consensus about method and model, which makes 
them undebatable, even though they should be at the center of the debate. 
  The correct use of the European CVAR approach is much more demanding than 
just pushing the J-button. It requires a researcher to be a simultaneous expert in theory, 
macroeconometrics and institutions, and to use that judgment in coming to a conclusion. 
It eschews cookbook methods. This makes it difficult to publish in the economic 
professional environment that guides researchers to use cookbook methods that can have 
come to be accepted, and can be blindly refereed. The true Johansen method requires 
researcher judgment and thus is not easily amenable to advancement systems that are 
highly dependent on blind referring processes. That is my judgment of why it is not the 
generally accepted method, and why it will have a difficult time becoming the generally 
accepted method unless the institutions change. 
7. Conclusion 
Let me conclude by summarizing my answer the question I posed at the beginning: 
Why has the European approach to macroeconometrics had only limited success in the 
competition for ideas? My answer is that a likely reason is that it is not as compatible 
with the replicator dynamics of the academic economics profession as is the DSGE-
model first approach.  
I certainly am not claiming that I have proven my argument. The arguments in 
this paper are laced with judgments and intuition based on informal, not formal, evidence. 
Ultimately, such judgments play an important role on all economists’ arguments. My 
hope with this paper is not to prove anything, but rather to stimulate discussion and 
debate among those who have a deeper understanding of the various approaches than I do. 
Ideally that debate would lead each side to spell out their judgments and intuitions. In my 
view, such a debate would add much more to our understanding of the macro economy 
and do more to further macroeconomic thought than would another 100 papers extending 
the DSGE model or 100 papers applying the cointegrated VAR model to a data set.  
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